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 That the election for President in 2000 was decided by a court 
surprised everyone. That the election was decided by a federal court 
was even more surprising. But, the fact that three Justices supported 
that decision based on second-guessing a state court’s construction of 
state law possibly was more astonishing still. 
 Prior to the 2000 presidential election, no one could have foreseen 
the pivotal role played by the United States Supreme Court. Never 
had an election of that magnitude hinged on court intervention. The 
Supreme Court’s dramatic decision, Bush v. Gore,1 doomed the hopes 
of former Vice President Gore and precipitated his concession. But, 
perhaps almost as importantly, the decision immediately cast a pall 
upon the institution of the Court itself, for the decision appeared to 
many as a crass political move designed to ensure the election of the 
Justices’ personal choice for office. The reasoning of the Justices was 
labeled conclusory, unintelligible, and worse.2 
 Conservative members of the Court who champion federalism ap-
peared willing in Bush v. Gore to ignore years of precedent by second-
guessing the Florida Supreme Court’s construction of state law. The 
U.S. Supreme Court on countless prior occasions had held that state 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank 
Trevor Morrison and Steve Siegel for their excellent comments on an earlier draft, and I 
would like to thank the Florida State University College of Law for taking the initiative to 
host this symposium. 
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2. For a sampling of the editorials, see Fred Barbash, A Brand New Game, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at B1; Alan Dershowitz, The Supreme Court and the 2000 Election, 
SLATE, July 2-9, 2001, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=111313; Anthony Lewis, Legitimacy: 
Supreme Court Decision Undercuts Americans’ Belief in Judiciary, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Dec. 12, 2000, at 27A; Kirk Loggins & John Shiffman, Supreme Court’s Decision to 
Stop Recount Spurs Ethical Political Debate, THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 14, 2000, at 1A. 
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supreme courts are the final expositors of the meaning of state law.3 
Under our system of governance, federal courts have no role in over-
seeing or participating in evolution of state law. 
 Nonetheless, three United States Supreme Court Justices in Bush 
v. Gore would have held that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
ordering a recount violated Article II, Section 1’s requirement that 
“[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct” electors for President and Vice President.4 They 
reasoned that the Florida state court’s “interpretation of the Florida 
election laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair read-
ing required”5 and thereby violated Article II, Section 1 of the Consti-
tution.6 Indeed, that was the Bush team’s principal argument in its 
brief: the Florida court in effect made new law in interpreting the 
contest provisions and thus trampled upon the state legislature’s 
federal constitutional right to choose the manner in which electors 
are selected.7 The three Justices, therefore, would have second-
guessed the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida law to 
protect a federal constitutional guarantee.8 That conclusion seems to 
turn federalism principles on their head and foretells an increased 
role for the Supreme Court in subsequent disputes over the interpre-
tation and application of state law. 
                                                                                                                    
 3. E.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (holding that Congress had not authorized U.S. Supreme Court 
review of state law issues). Despite those precedents, the Court’s earlier decision in Bush v. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000), signaled its intent to review the 
Florida court’s interpretation of its own state’s law, and the question of whether the Flo-
rida court had acted properly in construing state law occupied the headlines leading to the 
second U.S. Supreme Court decision. Interestingly enough, however, the Supreme Court 
prior to 1863 deferred to state court construction of state law but had not ruled out its own 
role as a categorical matter. See Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 298 (1832) 
(finding that state tribunals had no “power to bind this Court”). The Court indicated 
change in Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 599, 603 (1863). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) 
(stating that Article II confers “plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the 
appointment of electors”). 
 5. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115. 
 6. This Article assumes the correctness of the Court’s exposition of Article II, which 
the dissenting Justices largely did not dispute. 
 7. Brief for Petitioner at 19-33, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949). In-
deed, some have speculated that the concurrence was originally slated to be the majority 
opinion. See David G. Sauvage & Harvey Weinstein, Right to Vote Led Justices to 5-4 Rul-
ing, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A1. At oral argument, Justice O’Connor twice remarked 
that “it just does look like a very dramatic change made by the Florida court,” and Justice 
Kennedy offered a similar observation. Oral Argument Transcript at 38-39, Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836), available at http:// 
www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html. 
 8. Chief Judge Richard Posner in his recent book wrote that the changed law argu-
ment would have provided the Court with the most solid legal ground upon which to base 
its result. According to Posner, the argument at a minimum was “respectable.” RICHARD 
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
COURTS 152 (2001). 
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 Despite the seeming affront to federalism, however, the three Jus-
tices were on firm ground in holding that the U.S. Supreme Court 
can review a state court’s construction of state law in order to protect 
a federal right.9 In a variety of circumstances, that Court has scruti-
nized state court decisionmaking to ensure that state judges had not 
altered state law so as to defeat federal rights. For instance, in Bouie 
v. City of Columbia,10 the Court held that South Carolina’s interpre-
tation of a state trespass statute violated federal due process guaran-
tees by changing the law in effect at the time of the defendant’s of-
fense.11 Similarly, the Court in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand12 
reviewed the Indiana Supreme Court’s determination that a public 
school teacher did not enjoy any contract rights under Indiana law so 
that it could ascertain whether subsequent legislation had impaired 
her rights under the Contracts Clause.13 The Court has similarly re-
viewed state court construction of state laws in treaty cases when-
ever the federally protected right may be lost by a state court’s overly 
creative interpretation of state law.14 The three Justices thus had 
ample precedent for reviewing state judges’ interpretation of state 
law to ensure protection for the constitutionally protected interest in 
state legislative selection of electors.15  
 Moreover, the Court in both the Bouie and Contracts Clause con-
texts has inquired whether state judicial decisions have so changed 
state law as to deprive an individual or firm of the settled expecta-
tions protected under the Constitution. In order to protect federal 
rights safeguarding against excessive retroactivity, the Court has not 
                                                                                                                    
 9. This is not to suggest, however, that the Court should have intervened in the dis-
pute in the first instance. Rather, I contend that the three Justices’ consideration of 
whether the Florida Supreme Court impermissibly changed state law is neither novel nor 
unwarranted. 
 10. 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
 11. Id. at 349. 
 12. 303 U.S. 95 (1938). 
 13. Lower courts have also assessed whether state courts have changed state law gov-
erning election disputes. For an insightful analysis, see Richard H. Pildes, Judging “New 
Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 (2001); see also POSNER, supra note 
8, at 159 (“Nothing is more infuriating than changing the election rules after the outcome 
of the election, conducted under existing rules, is known.”). 
 14. See Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 626-28 (1813) 
(concluding that state court erred in determining whether 1789 ejectment order consti-
tuted a confiscation under a 1783 peace treaty with Great Britain); see also NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 456 (1958) (second-guessing state court’s application 
of state procedural rule that had the effect of barring review of a federal claim). 
 15. An interesting exception is posed in takings cases, where—despite the concur-
rence’s implication to the contrary, see Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)—the Court has steadfastly refused to hold that judicial 
changes in the law can effect takings of property. See, e.g., Brinkeroff-Faris Trust & Sav. 
Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930); see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 1449 (1990) (addressing the Court’s failure to permit changes in judicial doctrine to 
constitute takings under the Constitution). 
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only second-guessed determinations by the state’s highest court on 
state law, but asked whether state judicial pronouncements changed 
prior law. 
 Irrespective of the doctrinal pedigree, however, the Rehnquist 
concurrence is extraordinary in applying the above principles. When 
the Court has reviewed state law decisionmaking in other contexts, it 
has afforded wide latitude to state court decisionmaking. It has only 
disputed state court construction of state law on rare occasions, and 
it has concluded that state court decisions made “new” law even more 
rarely. The Justices’ willingness in Bush v. Gore to hold that the 
state court interpretation of state law changed Florida’s law flies in 
the face of the Court’s reticence to examine state court decisions 
closely, even in the contexts in which federal rights undeniably are at 
stake. The Court has taken great pains in other settings not to sub-
stitute its own view of state law for that of state courts. In Bush v. 
Gore, the instrument of last resort became a frontline weapon of at-
tack. 
 Part I of this Article examines the state law issues in Bush v. Gore 
and the Rehnquist concurrence’s willingness to substitute its own in-
terpretation for that of the Florida Supreme Court. The Rehnquist 
concurrence focused principally on the Florida court’s refusal to defer 
to the certification of election results and its determination that the 
intent of the voter standard should govern. In contrast, the dissent-
ing Justices painted a very different picture of Florida’s legislative 
terrain. And, they lambasted the concurrence for failing to defer to 
the state court’s interpretation. 
 Part II of this Article sketches two contexts in which the U.S. Su-
preme Court has reviewed judicial interpretations to determine 
whether the interpretations “changed” or “altered” preexisting law. 
Under the Bouie doctrine, federal courts have assessed state court 
construction of state law to determine whether any change in doc-
trine violated the defendant’s due process rights. Similarly, under 
the Contracts Clause, federal courts in the past questioned state 
court articulation of state contract law in order to protect the federal 
right that the state not impair the obligation of contracts. 
 Underlying decisions in the two contexts swirl notions of fair no-
tice, predictability, and mistrust for lower court judicial power. To 
some extent the Article II, Section 1 setting shares these concerns. 
State court judges might alter state law in a way that favors their 
own political leanings or futures. Furthermore, stability and predict-
ability are particularly important values when elections are at stake. 
In the absence of review, state courts, by interpreting state law ad-
venturously, could nullify the directive in Article II that it is the 
province of state legislatures to determine the manner in which elec-
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tors to the presidential election are to be chosen. The Rehnquist con-
currence was on solid ground in asserting the power to review. 
 Yet, with limited exceptions, the Supreme Court in practice has 
upheld state court interpretation of state law in the Bouie and Con-
tracts Clause settings. Part III sketches some of the means by which 
federal courts have avoided concluding that state law had “changed.” 
Through a mixture of fictions and judicial legerdemain, federal 
judges have concluded that state judicial interpretations in both the 
Bouie and Contracts Clause contexts were foreshadowed in some 
way. Indeed, in the Contracts Clause setting, the federal courts sub-
sequently withdrew from the field altogether. The Court is now will-
ing to defer completely to state judicial construction of the state law 
determinants of the federally protected right. 
 Part III then returns to Bush v. Gore through the prism of these 
precedents. Although the principle underlying the Rehnquist concur-
rence is sound, the application is bewildering. The Florida Supreme 
Court’s construction of Florida law, while in no way dictated by 
precedent or the plain language of the statutory scheme, was at a 
minimum, plausible. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently failed 
to disturb far more questionable state court decisions in the Bouie 
and Contracts Clause contexts. There is nothing in the Article II set-
ting that demands a more searching inquiry than in the Bouie or 
Contracts Clause contexts. 
 Sound policy reasons support the Court’s prior reluctance to 
second-guess state court interpretations of state law. First, as a mat-
ter of judicial administration, permitting challenges to judicial deci-
sions that “change” the law is highly problematic because many los-
ing parties will have the incentive to challenge state court judgments 
in the Article II, Contracts Clause, and Bouie contexts in federal 
court. Second, given that judges always have made law interstitially 
through decisions, distinguishing which interpretations change the 
law more dramatically than others is quite daunting. Finally, feder-
alism concerns plainly counsel against exacting scrutiny of state 
court interpretations of state law, even where federal interests are at 
stake. Thus, in comparison to decisions in related fields, the three 
Justices’ conclusion that the Florida Court’s decision was so unfore-
seeable that it changed law is nothing short of startling. 
I.   BUSH V. GORE AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT 
OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 1 
 Florida’s legislature, like that in every state today, has deter-
mined that presidential electors should be appointed by direct elec-
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tion. Its legislatively designed mechanism for selecting electors in 
200016 was relatively detailed, though far from clear. 
 Under the statute, “[v]otes cast for the actual candidates for 
President and Vice President shall be counted as votes cast for the 
presidential electors supporting such candidates.”17 The legislature 
delegated to county canvassing boards the responsibility of adminis-
tering elections.18 The legislature also directs the canvassing boards 
to provide results to the state Elections Canvassing Commission, 
comprised of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Director of 
the Division of Elections.19 
 After the election, the county canvassing boards were to receive 
returns from precincts, count the votes, and conduct a mandatory re-
count if a candidate lost by less than .5% of the vote.20 In addition, 
the boards were to certify election returns with the Secretary of State 
by 5 p.m. on the seventh day following the election, and the Elections 
Canvassing Commission subsequently certified the results of the 
election.21 
 A losing candidate could have contested the certified election re-
sults if, among other things, there was “[r]eceipt of a number of ille-
gal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change 
or place in doubt the result of the election.”22 The statute further 
provided that “[t]he circuit judge to whom the contest is presented 
may fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that 
each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or 
checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any 
relief appropriate under such circumstances.”23 
 On November 26, 2000, the Florida Elections Canvassing Com-
mission certified the results of the election in favor of Governor Bush. 
The next day, Vice President Gore filed a complaint in Leon County 
Circuit Court contesting the certification. A two-day evidentiary 
hearing focused on the so-termed undervote in counties in which ma-
chines tabulated votes on punch cards. Vice President Gore intro-
duced evidence suggesting that the tabulation missed a sufficient 
number of votes that would have swung Florida’s election in his fa-
vor. Governor Bush defended by arguing that no sound statistical 
method existed for determining the extent of the undervote, and he 
                                                                                                                    
 16. The Florida Legislature passed wholesale amendments to its elections procedures 
in the 2001 session. See Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, at 117-
73. 
 17. FLA. STAT. § 103.011 (2000) (amended 2001). 
 18. Id. § 102.141 (amended 2001). 
 19. Id. § 102.111 (amended 2001). 
 20. Id. § 102.141(4) (amended 2001).  
 21. Id. §§ 102.111-.112 (amended 2001). 
 22. Id. § 102.168(3)(c). 
 23. Id. § 102.168(8) (repealed 2001). 
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asserted that it was not clear whether a different tabulation would 
have tipped the election.24 
 Leon County Circuit Court Judge Sanders Sauls agreed, holding 
that Vice President Gore had failed to meet the required burden of 
proof.25 Judge Sauls ruled that the circuit court could not overrule 
the canvassing commission’s certification absent an abuse of discre-
tion. Gore’s burden, according to Judge Sauls, was to prove, “but for 
the irregularity, or inaccuracy claimed, the result of the election 
would have been different, and he or she would have been the win-
ner. . . . [A] reasonable probability that the results of the election 
would have been changed must be shown.”26 He concluded that “there 
[was] no credible statistical evidence, and no other competent evi-
dence to establish by a preponderance of a reasonable probability 
that the results of the statewide election in the State of Florida 
would be different from the result which had been certified . . . .”27 
Judge Sauls did not, however, issue any specific findings of fact.28 
 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed in part. The court 
determined first that Judge Sauls had erred in extending deference 
to the certification of the state election authorities.29 Rather, it was 
for the circuit court itself to determine whether “a number of illegal 
votes” had been counted or whether the state had rejected “a number 
of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the 
election.”30 Furthermore, the court held that the contestant did not 
need to show a “reasonable probability” that the election would have 
resulted differently if proper votes had been counted. Instead, a con-
testant need only demonstrate that “available data shows that a 
number of legal votes would be recovered from the entire pool of the 
subject ballots, which, if cast for the unsuccessful candidate, would 
change or place in doubt the result of the election.”31 A possibility, in 
other words, would have sufficed. 
 In addition, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Gore satis-
fied the threshold requirement by demonstrating that, upon consid-
eration of the thousands of undervote ballots presented—those bal-
lots with no registered vote—the number of legal votes therein were 
sufficient to at least place in doubt the result of the election.32 To 
                                                                                                                    
 24. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 25. Gore v. Harris, CV No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), 
rev’d, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 26. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1255. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1247. 
 29. Id. at 1252. 
 30. Id. at 1253 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2000)). 
 31. Id. at 1256. 
 32. Id.  
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reach its conclusion, it construed the statutory term “rejection” to in-
clude instances where the county canvassing board failed to count le-
gal votes; that is, votes in which the intent of the voter could be dis-
cerned, irrespective of whether the ballots had been mismarked.33 
The court relied on a neighboring statutory provision, section 
101.5614(5), to reject the view of the Secretary of State—reflected in 
an administrative opinion34—and the Bush camp that “legal vote” re-
ferred only to a vote “properly executed in accordance with the in-
structions provided to all registered voters.”35 As a remedy, the court 
determined that there should be a recount of the undervote in all 
Florida counties, not just those challenged by Gore in his contest pe-
tition.36 
 In dissent, Chief Justice Wells retorted that the majority’s reading 
of the contest provisions “has no foundation in the law of Florida as it 
existed on November 7, 2000 . . . .”37 He would have shown deference 
to the county canvassing boards and would have held that a contest 
could only be granted if the plaintiff demonstrated a “substantial 
noncompliance with election laws,” which Gore had not done.38 
 The Rehnquist concurrence agreed with Chief Justice Wells. The 
opinion charged that the Florida Supreme Court decision “empties 
certification of virtually all legal consequence during the contest, and 
in doing so, departs from the provisions enacted by the Florida Legis-
lature.”39 The concurring Justices asserted that the election code 
vests discretion in the county canvassing boards to determine 
whether to recount, and thus deference should have been afforded to 
the boards,40 as Circuit Judge Sauls had held. Moreover, the concur-
rence stated that “Florida statutory law cannot reasonably be 
thought to require the counting of improperly marked ballots.”41 
Thus, the concurrence, unlike the Florida Supreme Court, would 
have held that Florida law does not turn on an intent of the voter 
standard when a ballot had been mismarked. The statewide recount 
ordered by the Florida court similarly found no support in Florida 
law. 
 According to the concurrence, the Florida court had not merely 
misread the legislative scheme but rearranged it beyond recognition: 
“the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida election 
                                                                                                                    
 33. Id. at 1257. 
 34. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (address-
ing 00-13 Fla. Op. Div. of Elec. (2000)). 
 35. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1257. 
 36. Id. at 1261-62. 
 37. Id. at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 1264-68. 
 39. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 40. Id. at 117-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 118-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading re-
quired . . . .”42 No deference was due because, “[t]o attach definitive 
weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question 
at issue is whether the court has actually departed from the statu-
tory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the 
explicit requirements of Article II.43 The concurrence thus advocated 
active, if not de novo, review of state law requirements.44 
 In dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that the Florida Supreme 
Court had not made “any substantive change in Florida electoral 
law.45 Rather, “[i]t did what courts do—it decided the case before it in 
light of the legislature’s intent to leave no legally cast vote un-
counted.46 Justice Souter’s dissent similarly concluded that “[n]one of 
the state court’s interpretations is unreasonable to the point of dis-
placing the legislative enactment quoted.”47 The opinion noted that 
“other interpretations were of course possible, and some might have 
been better than those adopted by the Florida court’s majority,”48 but 
concluded that the state court’s view was “within the bounds of rea-
sonable interpretation . . . .”49 Given that the statute did not define 
“legal vote,” Justice Souter explained that the state court’s adoption 
of the intent of the voter standard from a neighboring provision was 
highly plausible.50 Similarly, its reading of “rejection” to mean not 
counted was reasonable—there was no requirement to read into re-
jection some kind of machine malfunction.51 Moreover, Justice Souter 
found no clear Florida statutory basis for determining whether the 
contest standard required a plaintiff to demonstrate a probability as 
opposed to a possibility that the outcome would be different if the 
undervotes were tabulated.52 
 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg’s separate dissent retorted that “dis-
agreement with the Florida court’s interpretation of its own State’s 
law does not warrant the conclusion that the justices of that court 
have legislated.”53 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion also decried 
the analysis in the Rehnquist concurrence: “I do not see how one 
                                                                                                                    
 42. Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 43. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 44. At one point the concurrence suggested that the Article II, Section 1 context was 
an area “in which the Constitution requires the Court to undertake an independent, if still 
deferential, analysis of state law.” Id. at 114. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The level of 
deference intended is unclear. 
 45. Id. at 127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 128 (footnote ommited) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 132 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 132-33 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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could call its plain language interpretation of a 1999 statutory 
change so misguided as no longer to qualify as judicial interpretation 
or as a usurpation of the authority of the State legislature.”54 
 Both the concurring and dissenting opinions accepted the premise 
that Article II, Section 1 prohibits state courts from changing the 
manner in which presidential electors are selected. Moreover, the 
opinions also agreed that claims asserting that state courts had 
changed state law were subject to U.S. Supreme Court oversight.55 
They disagreed, however, over the extent to which Florida’s highest 
court changed Florida law and the measure of deference that the 
Court should afford to state court construction of state law. 
II.   SECOND-GUESSING STATE COURT CONSTRUCTION OF STATE LAW 
TO PROTECT FEDERAL RIGHTS 
 The Rehnquist concurrence’s second-guessing of state court inter-
pretations of state law is not unique. In a variety of other contexts, 
the Supreme Court has scrutinized state court interpretation of state 
law to ensure protection for federal rights. Accordingly, this Part fo-
cuses on two areas—the Bouie doctrine and Contracts Clause—in 
which the Court at times has exercised the power to review state 
court interpretations of state law. 
A.   Bouie and its Progeny 
 Prior to Bouie v. City of Columbia,56 judicial change in the crimi-
nal law violated no federal constitutional guarantee. Although the Ex 
Post Facto Clause prohibited retroactive imposition of legislative 
change, members of the Court had long opined that judicial change 
did not fall within the Ex Post Facto Clause.57 
 In Bouie, however, the Court reversed a trespass conviction on the 
ground that the state conviction rested on an unexpected construc-
tion of the state trespass statute by the South Carolina Supreme 
Court.58 The state supreme court had construed a trespass statute 
prohibiting “entry upon the lands of another . . . after notice from the 
owner or tenant prohibiting such entry” to apply to African-American 
                                                                                                                    
 54. Id. at 152 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Neither Justice O’Connor nor Justice Kennedy 
weighed in on the issue. Although one can speculate as to reasons for their reticence, the 
upshot is that no majority of the Court agreed on the Article II issue. 
 55. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, however, calls for almost total deference to the state 
court construction. Id. at 135-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 56. 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
 57. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 224 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ex post facto [clause] . . . has not ordinarily been thought to apply to judicial legisla-
tion.”); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause “is 
a restraint upon legislative power and concerns the making of laws, not their construction 
by the courts”). 
 58. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 350. 
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demonstrators at a lunch counter who entered the lunch counter 
premises before the owner asked them to leave.59 Although the Su-
preme Court noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s con-
struction of the statute—applying it to individuals refusing to leave 
another’s property after being so requested—was possible, it held 
that retroactive application of the interpretation violated due process 
because the statute did not “give fair warning of the conduct that it 
makes a crime.”60 
 The Court acknowledged that it was reading ex post facto princi-
ples into the Due Process Clause. As the Court explained in greater 
depth: 
an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, ap-
plied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law. . . . 
If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from 
passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is 
barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the 
same result by judicial construction.61 
Given that the state court judges apparently strained to affix some 
criminal liability upon the civil rights protestors, prohibiting retroac-
tive application of unforeseeable judicial constructions may have had 
the salutary effect of improving future state judicial decisionmaking. 
When evaluating the deeds of an accused, judges may wish to bend 
the law to ensure that the accused is punished by including the ob-
jectionable conduct within a criminal enactment. After Bouie, South 
Carolina and other courts might hesitate before again interpreting 
criminal provisions merely to ensure punishment for the offender be-
fore the court. Lower courts have extended the Supreme Court’s due 
process analysis to unforeseeable judicial changes in sentencing 
structure as well,62 making the theoretical reach of the Due Process 
and Ex Post Facto Clauses congruent. 
                                                                                                                    
 59. Id. at 349-50. 
 60. Id. at 350. For a contextual analysis of Bouie as part of the Court’s response to the 
civil rights movement, see Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dis-
sonance, 77 YALE L.J. 1520, 1530 (1968); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Mod-
ern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 273-76 (1991). 
 61. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54. The Court adopted similar reasoning several years 
later in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 316 (1972). See also Marks v. United States, 
430 U.S. 188 (1977) (holding that the Due Process Clause prevented retroactive application 
of a new judicial test for ascertaining pornography restrictions); Douglas v. Buder, 412 
U.S. 430, 432 (1973) (determining that the judge’s construction of the term “arrest” to in-
clude traffic citation was unforeseeable); cf. Helton v. Fauver, 930 F.2d 1040, 1042 (3d Cir. 
1991) (holding that New Jersey’s construction of jurisdictional statute affecting prosecution 
of juveniles was unforeseeable); Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the state court’s change in felony murder doctrine was not foreseeable). 
 62. See, e.g., Green v. Catoe, 220 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds 
by Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000); Dale v. Haeberlin, 878 F.2d 930 (6th 
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 Because interpretation is not a mechanical exercise, judicial con-
structions—particularly of broadly worded texts—seem like conven-
tional lawmaking. Judicial interpretations that alter the substantive 
definition of a crime can imperil liberty to the same extent as legisla-
tive change that would violate the ex post facto doctrine. Surprising 
judicial decisions deprive an offender of notice to the same extent as 
a new legislative enactment enlarging the scope of a criminal provi-
sion.63 
B.   Contracts Clause 
 The Constitution provides that “[N]o State shall . . . [pass any] law 
impairing the obligation of contracts . . . .”64 The Contracts Clause 
operates as a substantial protection against state interference in pri-
vate contractual obligations. For instance, in Allied Structural Steel 
v. Spannaus65 the Court struck down a Minnesota statute that safe-
guarded certain workers’ expectations of receiving pensions. The 
Court reasoned that the law “nullifies express terms of the company’s 
contractual obligations and imposes a completely unexpected liability 
in potentially disabling amounts.”66  
 The Supreme Court has held that the question of whether the con-
tract was impaired, as in Spannaus, is a federal question. Given that 
the Constitution introduces the term “impairing,” that conclusion is 
logical. But a more intriguing issue is whether federal courts, in or-
der to protect federal rights, can second-guess a state court’s deter-
mination whether a contract exists. 
 Consider Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand.67 There, a public 
school teacher asserted that she had earned tenure under the exist-
ing statutory framework.68 Her contract had contained the clause: 
“[I]t is further agreed by the contracting parties that all of the provi-
sions of the Teachers’ Tenure Law, approved March 8, 1927, shall be 
in full force and effect in this contract . . . .”69 Upon termination in 
                                                                                                                    
Cir. 1989); Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982); Foster v. Barbour, 613 F.2d 
59 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 63. Indeed, the concern for constructive notice may play a larger role in restraining 
judicial, rather than legislative, retroactivity. When the legislature changes a standard of 
conduct retroactively, there is little concern for augmenting the power of police and 
prosecutors. In contrast, when judges fashion new doctrine and apply it to the case at bar, 
police and prosecutors as opposed to legislators have already selected the particular 
defendant for punishment. In any common law of crimes system, prosecutors and police 
play a more important role than with legislatively defined crimes. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. For a history, see BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., 
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-26 (1938). 
 65. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
 66. Id. at 247. 
 67. 303 U.S. 95 (1938). 
 68. Id. at 97. 
 69. Id. at 97. 
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July 1933, she sued in state court, alleging a breach of contract. The 
Indiana Supreme Court upheld her dismissal on the ground that the 
Teachers Tenure Law of 1927 had been repealed with respect to 
township public school teachers and that, under Indiana law, no ten-
ure attached and therefore that no tenure rights could currently be 
enjoyed.70 
 The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the question posed 
was “one primarily of state law,” but continued that, “in order that 
the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we are 
bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are 
its terms and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legisla-
tion, impaired its obligation.”71 The Court explained that “[u]ntil its 
decision in the present case the Supreme Court of the State had uni-
formly held that the teacher’s right to continued employment by vir-
tue of the indefinite contract created pursuant to the Act was con-
tractual.”72 The Supreme Court therefore rejected the state court’s 
apparent flip-flop, and held that the teacher’s contract had been im-
paired by the 1933 law. In order to protect the petitioner’s contract 
rights, the Supreme Court thus rejected the state Supreme Court’s 
analysis of whether a contract existed under state law.  
 More recently, the Court in General Motors Corp. v. Romein73 
clarified that, although “ultimately we are bound to decide for our-
selves whether a contract was made,” the Court “accord[s] respectful 
consideration and great weight to the views of the State’s highest 
court.”74 Federal courts will second-guess state courts’ determination 
of whether contractual rights exist under state law. 
 But the Contracts Clause context also highlights another problem: 
what if it is a state judicial decision as opposed to state legislation 
which impairs the obligation of contract? In Brand, for instance, it 
may have not been the 1927 law that stripped away the teacher’s ex-
pectations but the judicial decision construing the law’s require-
ments. Should judicial changes in statutory interpretation be treated 
the same as a legislative amendment? As in the ex post facto context, 
the language of the clause seems directed to state legislatures as op-
posed to state judiciaries, but the impact of any impairment would be 
identical on the firm whose contract rights had been impaired.75 Ju-
dicial change can be as devastating as legislative alteration. 
                                                                                                                    
 70. Id. at 98. 
 71. Id. at 100. 
 72. Id. at 105. 
 73. 503 U.S. 181 (1992). 
 74. Id. at 187 (quoting Brand, 303 U.S. at 100). 
 75. For a review of the original understanding, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The His-
tory of the Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1384-87 (1992). 
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 The mid-nineteenth century case of Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque76 is 
representative. In 1800s Dubuque and elsewhere, taxpayers were 
stuck holding the bag when municipalities could not afford to honor 
their obligation on railway bonds. The predicted economic boom did 
not come to pass. Iowa’s courts had previously sustained the consti-
tutionality of the municipalities’ authority to issue the bonds, but 
taxpayers nevertheless sued the City of Dubuque, renewing their ar-
gument. This time, the state court held that the city had no such 
power under Iowa’s Constitution.77 Bondholders, seeing the hand-
writing on the wall, sued the city in federal court for recovery of in-
terest on the bonds. The case eventually was heard by the U.S. Su-
preme Court. 
 The Supreme Court, relying on its diversity jurisdiction,78 held 
that federal courts were bound by decisions of state courts on state 
law at the time the contract was concluded, but that subsequent 
state decisions as to the substance of state law were not binding. Ac-
cordingly, the Court relied on the earlier Iowa judicial pronounce-
ments and concluded that the city was obligated to pay the bond-
holders. Changes in judicially fashioned law could only be applied 
prospectively: “otherwise . . . rights acquired under a statute may be 
lost by its repeal.”79 The Court concluded that “[w]e shall never im-
molate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal has 
erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.”80 As Chief Justice Waite 
later commented in Douglass v. Pike County,81  
[a]fter a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the con-
struction becomes, so far as contract rights acquired under it are 
concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a 
change of decision is to all intents and purposes the same in its ef-
fect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legis-
lative enactment.82 
                                                                                                                    
 76. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). 
 77. State ex rel. Burlington & Mo. R.R. v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388, 407 (1862). 
 78. Under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), federal courts 
exercised the power to interpret state law to protect the out-of-state party. The Court in 
Gelpcke and its progeny, however, appeared to base its rulings as well on the power to re-
solve the Contracts Clause claim. See, e.g., Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co. v. Louisi-
ana, 233 U.S. 362, 375 (1914); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 498 (1898); WRIGHT, su-
pra note 64, at 239-41; Thompson, supra note 75, at 1412-13. The Court in Township of 
Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666, 678 (1873), for instance, stated that “the Na-
tional Constitution forbids the States to pass laws impairing the obligations of contracts. 
In cases properly brought before us that end can be accomplished unwarrantably no more 
by judicial decisions than by legislation.” 
 79. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 206. 
 80. Id. at 206-07. 
 81. 101 U.S. 677 (1879). 
 82. Id. at 687. The Court continued that “[t]he true rule is to give a change of judicial 
construction in respect to a statute, the same effect in its operation on contracts and exist-
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 The Gelpcke doctrine likely arose from both ideological and eco-
nomic considerations. First, federal courts feared that state court 
elected justices would side with local interests and repudiate the ob-
ligations. As the Supreme Court noted in Wade v. Travis County,83 
absent federal court review, state decisions “would enable the State 
to set a trap for its creditors by inducing them to subscribe to bonds, 
and then withdrawing their own security.”84 Bondholders such as 
Gelpcke often lived outside the jurisdiction. Second, federal judges 
may have believed that stability in the capital markets was critical to 
continued growth of the country. The views expressed in the munici-
pal bond cases are all the more notable given the prevailing view at 
the time that judges applied or found the law, not made it.85 
 The Bouie and Contracts Clause contexts are analogous in many 
respects. Two overlapping rationales justified their invocation. First, 
in both cases, the Supreme Court was deeply concerned about proc-
ess. In Bouie, the Court feared that state judges—who largely were 
elected—would adopt strained interpretations of state statutes and 
common law in order to penalize a particular offender.86 Such over-
reaching would redound to their political benefit. Conversely, those 
subject to criminal sanctions constituted an easy target given their 
relative poverty and inability to sway elections. The concern for judi-
cial lawlessness was particularly acute in the civil rights era. Simi-
larly, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Contracts Clause to judi-
cial impairments in large part due to fears that state judges would 
protect municipalities within their jurisdictions at the expense of 
bondholders, who may well have lived outside the jurisdiction. In-
deed, a number of state legislatures in the years prior to Gelpcke had 
lessened judges’ independence, which could well have sparked fed-
eral judicial concern.87 Retroactive decisionmaking could target un-
popular or politically powerless individuals and firms. 
 Moreover, as in the Bouie example, those injured could not easily 
influence the political process if they were outside the jurisdiction.88 
The two doctrines therefore serve as a check on state judicial power 
in order to ensure that federal constitutional rights are protected. 
 Second, the Bouie and Gelpcke doctrines privileged concerns for 
settled expectations. In Bouie, the Court reasoned that all criminal 
                                                                                                                    
ing contract rights that would be given to a legislative amendment; that is to say, make it 
prospective, but not retroactive.” Id. 
 83. 174 U.S. 499 (1899). 
 84. Id. at 509; see also Ga. Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923); McCul-
lough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898). 
 85. Thompson, supra note 75, at 1419-22.  
 86. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 535 (1964). 
 87. See Thompson, supra note 75, at 1396-97. 
 88. In comparison to criminal defendants, however, bondholders could influence elec-
tions more effectively in light of their comparable economic clout. 
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defendants should have notice of the criminality and consequences of 
conduct before the fact.89 The rule of law demands that criminal 
prohibitions be clear before the disputed conduct takes place. 
Similarly, in Gelpcke, the Court believed that bondholders should 
understand the scope of their rights and obligations at the time they 
concluded the contract.90 Economic stability depended heavily on 
settled expectations. 
 Concerns underlying the Article II, Section 1 directive that state 
legislatures have exclusive power to direct the manner in which 
presidential electors are chosen91 similarly militate for federal court 
oversight. In the absence of review, Congress, governors, or state 
courts could manipulate the selection process so as to rob Article II of 
its meaning. 
 Article II, Section 1 reflects the view that individual citizens have 
no federal constitutional right to vote for electors unless the state 
legislature so directs. At times state legislatures exercised the power 
themselves to appoint electors.92 When states vest that right in their 
citizens, as they now all do, other governmental actors must abide by 
that choice. Under the Constitution, it remains the province of the 
state legislature not only to choose who selects electors but also the 
manner in which the selection takes place.93 As James Madison 
noted, “The State Judiciarys had not & he presumed wd. Not be pro-
posed as a proper course of appointment of the Presidential elec-
tors.”94 
 A concern for predictability, as in the Bouie and Contracts Clause 
contexts, is absolutely vital in the election context. When the rules of 
the game change midstream for criminal punishment or contract en-
forcement, individual rights undoubtedly suffer. But, when the rules 
of an election change, faith in the integrity of the election process it-
self may be compromised. The Constitution mandates that any such 
change come from the state legislature.95 
 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court scrutinized state court decision 
making in the Bouie and Contract Clause contexts as a check on ju-
dicial power. That concern applies as well in the Article II, Section 1 
                                                                                                                    
 89. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 352. 
 90. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206 (1863).  
 91. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 2.  
 92. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28-33 (1892). 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
 94. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 110 (Max Farrand ed., 
1966). 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Congress has also limited the legislature’s flexibility 
somewhat by fashioning the safe harbor provision. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) (informing state leg-
islatures that changes after the fact in the manner in which legislators are to be selected 
may be challenged in Congress). At some point, congressional interference in the state leg-
islative decision might itself violate Article II, Section 1. 
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context. Some oversight is needed to check state court jurists’ ability 
to affect a presidential election. 
 To the extent that history is relevant, the Framers wished to en-
sure both that the President not become beholden to the electing 
body and that the electing body not be subject to untoward political 
pressures. The Framers plausibly sought a compromise between 
vesting the selection power in an entity that was too powerful and 
might abuse the power to appoint electors and vesting it in an entity 
that was not accountable to the people for any manipulation. Unlike 
state executives, state legislatures were more numerous, less stable, 
and therefore unlikely to form a coalition over time that could extract 
promises from a President.96 And, unlike Congress, state legislatures 
would be more likely receptive to state concerns.97 The state legisla-
ture is directly accountable to the electorate and arguably is less 
likely subject to presidential influence than a governor hoping for a 
cabinet position (or other influence) or than a state judge hoping for 
elevation to the federal bench (or other position). Individual judges 
might be susceptible to untoward pressures to affect the manner in 
which presidential electors are selected.  
 Nor were judges necessarily subject to sufficient majoritarian 
checks. The choice of state legislature over national legislature, state 
executives, and state judiciary was significant but apparently was 
more a selection among lesser evils. Irrespective of the reason for the 
constitutional choice, fidelity to the Constitution presupposes some 
oversight of the elector selection process to ensure that it is the state 
legislature, as opposed to executive or judiciary, that is exercising the 
constitutionally entrusted power. 
 There is one important difference to consider. The purpose of Su-
preme Court review under Bouie and the Contracts Clause is to pro-
tect individuals, not the legislative domain. The Clause protects indi-
viduals only indirectly to the extent that vesting the power to deter-
mine the manner of selecting electors in the legislature preserves 
their interests. One might argue, therefore, that the structural pro-
                                                                                                                    
 96. As Justice Story commented, “The appointment of the president is not made to 
depend upon any preexisting body of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to 
prostitute their votes.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 745 (1987). 
 97. As James Madison explained, “the candidate would intrigue with the Legislature  
. . . and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views,” 2 JAMES MADISON, 
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 109, and that the national legislature, “be-
ing standing bodies, they could and would be courted, and intrigued with by the candidates 
by their partisans.” Id. at 110. Butler summed up the problem: “The two great evils to be 
avoided are cabal at home, and influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either if 
the Election be made by the National Legislature.” Id. at 112; see also 46 CONG. REC. 4398 
(1879) (reprinting letter from Madison to Jefferson averting to dangers of congressional in-
terference in Electoral College). 
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tection should be enforced less rigorously under Article II, Section 1 
than the individual rights under Bouie and the Contracts Clause. 
 Indeed, many might believe that enforcement of Article II should 
be left completely in Congress’s hands. Congress retains the right 
under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment to determine whether 
to count electoral votes from particular states. During the 1876 elec-
tion, Congress received two slates of electors from Florida and two 
other states and eventually had to determine which slate to count.98 
Congress at other times has determined whether to count contested 
votes from individual electors.99 The Constitution, therefore, may be 
seen as vesting enforcement of the Article II, Section 1 right in Con-
gress which, after all, is comprised of representatives from each 
state. Congress possesses the ultimate power to determine if a state 
judge or governor has impermissibly infringed the state legislative 
perrogative to prescribe the manner in which presidential electors 
are selected. 
 The Article II, Section 1 challenge might, therefore, be viewed as a 
political question. Similarly, in Luther v. Borden,100 the Court held 
that the Constitution commits the Republican Guarantee Clause101 to 
congressional enforcement. In the Borden case, two different gov-
ernments claimed lawful authority in Rhode Island, and rather than 
decide between the two, the Court opined that  
Congress must necessarily decide what government is established 
in the state before it can determine whether it is republican or not. 
And when the senators and representatives of a state are admitted 
into the councils of the union, . . . [a state’s] republican charac-
ter[] is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And 
its decision is binding on every other department of the gov-
ernment . . . .102 
Subsequent republican guarantee claims have been held nonjusticia-
ble.103  
 The Article II claim in Bush v. Gore similarly may be committed 
to Congress’s determination.104 If Congress accepts the electoral 
                                                                                                                    
 98. See Day by Day: What Happened in the Electoral College Controversy of 1876-77, 
HARPWEEK, at http://elections.harpweek.com/9Controversy/events-controversy.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 10, 2001). 
 99. See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEIL PIERCE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 
2000, at 113 (1999). 
 100. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 102. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42. There was little judicial oversight over federal 
elections at all prior to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 103. See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912); Coyle 
v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911). 
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votes, then it must have determined that the state legislature appro-
priately set the manner in which the electors were selected. More-
over, vesting that decision completely in Congress may prevent de-
lays and ensure sufficient time within which to conduct an orderly 
transition to the new administration. As Justice Breyer stated in the 
Bush v. Gore dissent, “[C]ongress is the body primarily authorized to 
resolve remaining disputes.”105 Justice Breyer further noted that  
“there is no reason to believe that federal law either foresees or re-
quires resolution of such a political issue by this Court.”106 
 Nevertheless, the Rehnquist concurrence plausibly concluded that 
at least some review is appropriate.107 In the absence of oversight, a 
judge, governor, or Congress could meddle in the state’s choice of how 
electors should be selected. Given that one of the reasons Article II 
vests the selection power in state legislatures was to prevent con-
gressional interference, it would make little sense—given contempo-
rary understanding of judicial review—to vest all oversight in Con-
gress. As the Framers warned, Congress could become too powerful if 
it exercised a direct role in selecting presidential electors. Article II, 
Section 1, therefore, should be seen as an aspect of federalism woven 
into the Constitution, and accordingly subject to some type of Su-
preme Court enforcement. 
 Thus, as in the Bouie and Contract Clause contexts, concerns for 
predictability and accountability support the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion to review state court interpretation of state law in the presiden-
tial elector setting. The question of whether state legislators have es-
tablished the manner in which presidential electors are selected ar-
guably does not pose a nonjusticiable political question. But, as Part 
III discusses, the availability of judicial review should not lead to the 
conclusion that exacting scrutiny is appropriate. 
III.   RETREAT FROM ENFORCEMENT OF BOUIE AND JUDICIAL 
IMPAIRMENT DOCTRINES 
 The Justices’ conflict in Bush v. Gore could not have been more 
clear. Three Justices were convinced that the Florida court’s con-
struction of state law was unmoored from the statute, while the four 
Justices in dissent were just as emphatic that the Florida court’s 
opinion reasonably reflected and implemented the intent of the legis-
lature. What neither side fully grappled with, however, was the theo-
retical and doctrinal difficulty of distinguishing reasonable from un-
                                                                                                                    
 104. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 234 (1993) (holding that the constitutional 
command in Article I, Section 3 that the Senate shall “try all Impeachments” is for the 
Senate alone to resolve). 
 105. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 154 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 106. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
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reasonable constructions of law. Examination of the Bouie and Con-
tracts Clause cases provides a cautionary tale. 
 Despite the doctrinal clarity of the Bouie and judicial impairment 
precedents, the Supreme Court, shortly after articulating the doc-
trines, began whittling away at their core. That Court and lower 
courts became extremely wary of second-guessing state court con-
struction of state law and therefore devised a series of devices to 
avoid the need to upset state court construction of state law. The 
Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore simply ignored this history. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s declaration that “[t]o attach definitive 
weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question 
at issue is whether the court has actually departed from the statu-
tory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the 
explicit requirements of Article II,”108 is undercut by generations of 
experience in the two analogous contexts. 
A.   The Bouie Doctrine 
 The Rehnquist concurrence noted that the Supreme Court had 
equated judicial interpretation with change in Bouie v. City of Co-
lumbia;109 and that the Bouie line of cases therefore supported its 
conclusion of a federal constitutional violation in Bush v. Gore.110 The 
concurrence was half right. Bouie fully supports the concurrence’s 
position but as this section discusses, developments after Bouie have 
dramatically limited its reach, undercutting the concurrence’s prop. 
 Just weeks before deciding Bush v. Gore, the Court heard oral ar-
gument in a Bouie case. In Rogers v. Tennessee, the defendant bru-
tally knifed a friend after a card game.111 Prosecutors indicted Rogers 
for attempted murder. The victim, reduced to a vegetative state, lin-
gered for over a year until he died from a kidney infection as a com-
plication of his injuries.112 Accordingly, prosecutors obtained a new 
indictment, charging Rogers with first-degree murder. A jury subse-
quently convicted Rogers of second-degree murder.113 
 On appeal, Rogers argued that preexisting Tennessee law pro-
vided that a killing could only be prosecuted as a homicide if the 
death arose within one year and a day.114 The Tennessee Supreme 
Court agreed with the defendant’s assessment of Tennessee homicide 
                                                                                                                    
 108. Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 109. 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
 110. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 111. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1999), aff’d, Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. 
Ct. 1693 (2001). 
 112. Id. at 395.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
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law but abolished the year-and-a-day rule.115 It noted that “[m]odern 
pathologists are able to determine the cause of death with much 
greater accuracy than was possible in earlier times.”116 Because the 
reasons underlying the rule no longer existed, the court decided to 
overrule it judicially. 
 With respect to whether to apply the rule retroactively, the state 
court held that abolition of the rule was “not an unexpected and un-
forseen [sic] judicial construction of a principle of criminal law.”117 
The Tennessee court further reasoned that “the rule has fallen into 
disfavor and had been legislatively or judicially abrogated by the vast 
majority of jurisdictions which had recently considered the issue.”118 
Developments in other jurisdictions had foreshadowed Tennessee’s 
own change. Moreover, the court pointed out that the rule had not 
been applied recently within the state.119 
 In a sense, the Tennessee court changed the law and expanded 
the zone of criminal liability. When Rogers committed his offense, the 
law of causation in Tennessee arguably precluded prosecutions for 
murder if the victim did not die within a year and a day.120 Indeed, 
the Tennessee highest court, unlike the Florida Supreme Court in 
Gore v. Harris,121 admitted that it was altering the preexisting law.122 
No Tennessee court had ever called the year-and-a-day rule into 
question. After Bush v. Gore, therefore, one might imagine that the 
Justices would easily conclude that retroactive application of the 
Court’s decision violates Bouie.  
 The Supreme Court, however, hardly blinked. Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion for the Court reinterpreted Bouie to wrest it from its roots in 
ex post facto doctrine.123 To apply the same strictures to the courts as 
to the legislature “would evince too little regard for the important in-
stitutional and contextual differences between legislating and com-
mon law decisionmaking . . . .”124 She continued that “[s]trict applica-
tion of ex post facto principles in that context would unduly impair 
the incremental and reasoned development of precedent that is the 
foundation of the common law system.”125 Only state law interpreta-
tions that are “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law 
which had been expressed prior to the conduct at issue” should be 
                                                                                                                    
 115. Id. at 401. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 402. 
 118. Id. at 397. 
 119. Id. at 402. 
 120. Id. at 395.  
 121. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore., 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
 122. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d at 400-01. 
 123. Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001). 
 124. Id. at 1695. 
 125. Id. at 1700. 
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overturned.126 Under that standard, the Court then held, as had the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, that the year-and-a-day rule “was not un-
expected and indefensible.”127 The Court noted that the rule widely 
had been viewed as “an outdated relic,” that it had been abolished in 
“the vast majority of jurisdictions recently to have addressed the is-
sue,” and that the rule had not been applied recently, if at all, in 
Tennessee.128 
 In dissent, Justice Scalia could only wonder what had happened to 
Bouie. Justice Scalia persuasively asserted that Buoie had not fo-
cused on “the unexpected and indefensible” language relied on by the 
majority, and he concluded that the majority opinion could not be 
squared with Bouie: “Today’s opinion produces . . . a curious Consti-
tution that only a judge could love. One in which (by virtue of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause) the elected representatives of all the people can-
not retroactively make murder what was not murder when the act 
was committed, but in which unelected judges can do precisely 
that.”129  
 Rogers, however, can be reconciled with developments post-Bouie. 
Few Bouie claims over the past twenty-five years have been success-
ful.130 Courts routinely apply new interpretations of statutory lan-
guage to criminal defendants appearing before them, even when 
those interpretations are not dictated by the plain language of the 
statutory provision. Bouie principles seldom prevent courts from ar-
riving at novel interpretations of statutory terms or from changing 
prior interpretations of the statutory language. The Bouie cases 
stand in stark contrast to the Rehnquist concurrence’s analysis. This 
Part next examines the doctrinal formulations that courts have used 
to block Bouie claims. 
 As in Rogers, courts have used foreseeability as the key to the 
Bouie inquiry, upholding judicial alterations in statutory interpreta-
tion as long as the changes were foreseeable. When courts make law, 
retroactive application arguably can be as unjust as in the legislative 
context,131 but when courts engage in the evolutionary interpretive 
process, their decisions are foreseeable and thus should be applied 
retroactively without concern for the individual rights at stake. 
                                                                                                                    
 126. Id. (citation omitted). 
 127. Id. at 1701. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130. I have adapted the following section from Harold J. Krent, “Should Bouie Be 
Buoyed?” Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 35, 57-77 (1997). 
 131.  For instance, U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, would plainly prevent a state legislature from retroactively rescinding the year-
and-a-day rule. 
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 Courts, however, have construed the objective foreseeability re-
quirement quite laxly. They have considered a wide range of factors 
in determining that a judicial change was foreseeable, stressing the 
ambiguity of a statute or regulation,132 precedents from other juris-
dictions,133 prior administrative interpretation of the statute,134 and 
whether the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in a similar 
case.135 No one indicator is dispositive, leaving wide room for the 
courts to deny a Bouie challenge. Courts, in other words, have acted 
as if judges almost never make law. 
 For instance, in State v. Mummey,136 the defendant assaulted a 
man outside a bar, in part by bludgeoning him with tennis shoes. 
Under the pertinent statute distinguishing felony from misdemeanor 
assault, the defendant could only be convicted if he used a weapon, 
which was defined as an instrument “readily capable of being used to 
produce death or serious bodily injury.”137 The court held that tennis 
shoes so qualified, and that the defendant should have anticipated 
such a construction of the statute.138 The conclusion of foreseeability 
is perplexing—tennis shoes in the public eye are not weapons, let 
alone “readily capable of being used to produce death or serious bod-
ily injury.” Moreover, if tennis shoes and other everyday articles of 
clothing can be considered weapons, then the difference between 
Montana’s punishment scheme for misdemeanor assault (without the 
weapon) and felonious assault (with a weapon) is difficult to perceive. 
 Mummey is far from unique. As the Ninth Circuit earlier opined, 
as long as the state court “construed the sentencing scheme in accor-
dance with the principles of statutory construction and its conclusion 
is certainly not ‘unexpected’ or  ‘indefensible’ no Bouie claim should 
be successful.”139 
                                                                                                                    
 132. See McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 133. See Hagan v. Caspari, 50 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 1995); State v. Mummey, 871 P.2d 
868 (Mont. 1994). 
 134. See, e.g., Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 135. See United States v. Russotti, 780 F. Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that 
the change in the interpretation of the criminal statute was foreseeable because the Su-
preme Court had granted certiorari in a case raising a similar interpretive question before 
the defendant had committed the crime). 
 136. 871 P.2d 868 (1994). 
 137. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(76) (1994). 
 138. Mummey, 871 P.2d at 871.  
 139. Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 708 (9th Cir. 1993). Consider as well the Bouie 
challenge raised in United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997). Even though Lanier ad-
dressed a challenge to judicially imposed change in federal law, the analysis is representa-
tive. The same need exists to determine whether judges have changed the law. Prosecutors 
alleged that the defendant state court judge assaulted several women in judicial chambers. 
They charged him with violating a civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994), on the 
ground that he had deprived the victims of “rights and privileges which are secured and 
protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, namely the right not to be 
deprived of liberty without due process of law, including the right to be free from wilful 
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 Moreover, courts have held that judges make no law even when 
overruling controlling administrative interpretations. Consider the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Metheny v. Hammonds.140 There, four 
Georgia state prisoners challenged retroactive application of a rule 
by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles that prisoners con-
victed of a fourth felony were ineligible for parole. The pertinent 
statute on its face was clear, providing that, upon conviction of the 
fourth felony, the individuals “shall not be eligible for parole until 
the maximum sentence has been served.”141 Nevertheless, two Geor-
gia Attorneys General had issued advisory opinions that the statute 
unconstitutionally infringed on the Board’s power under the Consti-
tution,142 and thus the Board had permitted parole for four-time of-
fenders. 
 In 1994, however, the Georgia Supreme Court in Freeman v. 
State143 signaled that the legislature could ban parole for a particular 
category of offenders. In response to Freeman, a new Attorney Gen-
eral decision directed the Board to stop granting parole for four-time 
offenders,144 and the Board accordingly changed its policy. 
 Those convicted of a fourth offense prior to Freeman, when the 
Board had been granting parole, argued that Freeman’s change could 
not be applied retroactively. The Metheny court, however, responded: 
“[T]hat lower state courts had struck down a few other attempts to 
limit the Board’s power or that the Attorney General had issued an 
opinion stating that the statute was unconstitutional is not deci-
                                                                                                                    
sexual assault.” Id. at 262 (quoting trial court indictment). After conviction, the defendant 
appealed, arguing that the federal statute did not criminalize sexual assaults by state offi-
cials, and that, if it did, then retroactive application of that novel interpretation violated 
his due process rights. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996). The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with him, setting aside the conviction, by holding 
that “[t]he indictment in this case for a previously unknown, undeclared and undefined 
constitutional crime cannot be allowed to stand.” Id.  
 In reversing, the Supreme Court did not take issue with defendant’s assertion that appli-
cation of the civil rights statute to sexual assault was entirely novel. Yet the Court held 
that novelty was not the key; rather, it stated that the “touchstone is whether the statute, 
either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that 
the defendant’s conduct was criminal.” 520 U.S. at 267. The Court counseled that, in con-
sidering whether the conduct’s criminality was “reasonably clear,” the Court itself need not 
have considered a similar claim, nor need it identify any lower court precedents involving 
substantially similar facts. Indeed, the Court clarified that criminal liability can attach 
merely if, “in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness [under the Constitution is] appar-
ent.” Id. at 271-72 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The Court 
accordingly remanded the case to the court of appeals for application of the new standard. 
The court of appeals never reached the issue on remand because Lanier failed to turn him-
self in to federal authorities. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with prejudice. United 
States v. Lanier, No. 99-5983, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28047 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000). 
 140. 216 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 141. GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-7(c) (2000). 
 142. Metheny, 216 F.3d at 1308.  
 143. 440 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. 1994). 
 144. Metheny, 216 F.3d at 1309.  
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sive.”145 The court continued that, because the Georgia Supreme 
Court had yet to decide the issue, its subsequent decision in Freeman 
was not “unforeseeable.”146 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit stressed 
“[t]hat the erroneous interpretations were later declared invalid and 
corrected by the state supreme court does not entitle Plaintiffs to the 
benefit of those mistaken interpretations.”147 It seems to blink reality 
to suggest that an inmate is not entitled to rely upon the official, ar-
ticulated position of the state parole authority with respect to the 
construction of a statute it is charged with administering, particu-
larly when two Attorney General opinions supported that position.148 
 The argument against foreseeable change is likely greatest when 
courts explicitly overrule judicial as opposed to administrative prece-
dent. In that context, courts act more overtly like legislatures in 
changing the law directly. Courts, however, have held that reversal 
of prior case law does not necessarily make the decision unforesee-
able. 
 For example, in Dale v. Haeberlin,149 the Sixth Circuit rejected a 
due process challenge to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dale v. Commonwealth,150 which upheld the prosecution’s use of the 
same felony both to prove underlying guilt (felon in possession of a 
weapon charge) and then to enhance his sentence for armed robbery 
as a persistent felony offender. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that 
the Kentucky Supreme Court’s Dale opinion overruled a prior Ken-
tucky Supreme Court decision but concluded that the offender had 
fair warning that his sentence for robbery could have been twenty-
                                                                                                                    
 145. Id. at 1312-13. 
 146. Id. at 1313. 
 147. Id. at 1314. 
 148. The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 
1992), is similar. The court rejected a prisoner’s due process challenge to the Colorado Su-
preme Court’s construction of a parole statute that limited parole opportunities for certain 
sexual offenders. The statute targeted “any person sentenced for conviction of a sex of-
fense, as defined in section 16-13-202(5) . . . [and] any person sentenced as a habitual 
criminal.” Id. at 554 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2-201 (5)(a) (1990)). The Colorado Parole 
Board had construed that statute to apply to habitual offenders and only those sexual of-
fenders sentenced under the Sex Offenders Act, of which section 16-13-202(5) was a part. 
The state supreme court later disagreed, however, reading the statute to cover anyone con-
victed of any charge within the broader category of sexual offenses. Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 
P.2d 801, 806 (Colo. 1990). The Tenth Circuit in Lustgarden conceded an ambiguity in the 
statute, namely whether the reference to section 202(5) was intended to limit the impact to 
those convicted under the Sexual Offenders Act or rather, as the state supreme court in 
Thiret had determined, just to furnish a definition of “sex offense.” The federal court held, 
however, that the state supreme court’s change was not unforeseeable, given that it ac-
corded with the most logical construction of the statute. Lustgarden, 966 F.2d at 553. 
 149. 878 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 150. 715 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1986). 
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five years, even if the same prior felony could not have been used at 
the time to establish one charge and enhance the other.151 
 Whether Dale could have anticipated a twenty-five year sentence 
or not is beside the point. He arguably should not have anticipated 
the state supreme court’s abrupt change as to whether the same 
prior felony could be used both at the liability and enhancement 
stages.152 And, he certainly was likely to receive a lighter sentence 
without the enhancement. 
 In United States v. Newman153 a defendant who pleaded guilty to 
bank robbery charges requested sentencing credit for time spent on 
pretrial release at a residential drug treatment program.154 Under 
Ninth Circuit precedent, Newman argued, credit was available both 
at the time Newman committed his offense and when he made the 
decision to participate in the drug treatment program.155 Shortly 
after Newman committed his offense, however, the United States 
Supreme Court in Reno v. Koray156 held that credit should not be 
available under the pertinent federal sentencing statute.157 The par-
                                                                                                                    
 151. Dale, 878 F.2d at 935. In another case, Commonwealth v. Santiago, 681 N.E.2d 
1205 (Mass. 1997), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that Santiago could 
be tried for first degree murder on the theory that “where the defendant chooses to engage 
in a gun battle with another with the intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm and a third 
party is killed, the defendant may be held liable for the homicide even if it was the defen-
dant’s opponent who fired the fatal shot.” Id. at 1215. Prior to that case, however, the Mas-
sachusetts court arguably had held that first degree murder could not be demonstrated in 
such circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314 (1965) (requiring 
that defendant be the one who pulled the trigger). The Court was not troubled by the 
change. 
 152. More generally, courts have held that litigants should anticipate that courts will 
overrule prior precedents from lower courts. For instance, in Hagan v. Caspari, 50 F.3d 
542 (8th Cir. 1995), the petitioner argued that the Missouri Supreme Court’s rejection of 
his double jeopardy claim was unforeseeable. Id. at 544. He had been charged both with 
second degree robbery for forcibly grabbing the keys to a van and then for stealing the van. 
Id. He argued that the two crimes merged because of Missouri’s single larceny rule, which 
defined the stealing of several articles of property during the same scheme or course of 
conduct as a single offense under Missouri Revised Statutes, § 570.050 (1986). Id. at 546. 
Under similar facts, a Missouri appellate court had found that conviction on both a robbery 
and theft charge would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See State v. Lewis, 633 S.W.2d 
110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Therefore, the petitioner in Hagan argued that, in overruling the 
appellate court’s interpretation of Missouri’s larceny statute, the state supreme court vio-
lated Bouie. Hagan, 50 F.3d at 544. 
 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that the change was foreseeable largely because 
the appellate court’s reasoning was plainly wrong. Id. at 546-47. The larceny statute may 
have prevented conviction on two separate stealing charges, but not for the distinct rob-
bery and theft charges. Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar conviction of the two 
charges. The court further commented that “[w]e have some doubt whether a state su-
preme court’s overruling of an intermediate appellate court decision ever can constitute a 
change in state law for due process purposes.” Id. at 547.  
 153. 203 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 154. Id. at 701.  
 155. Id. at 702. 
 156. 515 U.S. 50 (1995). 
 157. Id. at 65.  
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ties agreed that retroactive changes in the length of punishment fall 
within the protection of the Due Process Clause’s incorporation of ex 
post facto principles. 
 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that retroactive application of 
Koray to Newman was permissible, even though it marked a clear 
change of law within the circuit.158 The court reasoned that “the deci-
sion in Koray was reasonably foreseeable given the circuit split on 
the meaning of [the statute].”159 Cases from other jurisdictions evi-
dently undermined the plaintiff’s entitlement to rely on Ninth Circuit 
precedent. The Newman court also suggested that a “reversal of a 
prior incorrect interpretation of a statute . . . [was not] barred by 
Bouie . . . .”160 The undoing of a precedent, therefore, may be foresee-
able.161 Defendants may not be entitled to rely on the construction of 
a statute adopted by an appellate court because those precedents can 
always be overturned.162 
                                                                                                                    
 158. Newman, 203 F.3d at 703.  
 159. Id. The Ninth Circuit previously had held that defendants may not rely upon any 
judicial opinion that is subject to rehearing on review or certiorari. See United States v. 
Ruiz, 935 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that defendants were not entitled to rely 
on a prior appellate opinion which was withdrawn by the Ninth Circuit after the plea 
agreement had been reached); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 111 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that defendants could not rely upon the fact that federal sentencing guidelines 
had been invalidated at the time of sentencing, because the guidelines were later rein-
stated by the Supreme Court). 
 160. 203 F.3d at 702. 
 161. Similarly, in United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984), a federal case, the 
United States Attorney charged the defendant with making a false statement to the FBI 
and Secret Service in a “matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the 
United States.” Id. at 476 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)). Defendant allegedly 
apprised the FBI that his wife was involved in a plot to assassinate the President and that 
she had been kidnapped. Id. at 476. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the 
basis of a prior Eighth Circuit decision that construed the language “within the jurisdiction 
of any department or agency” to refer only to areas in which the agency had the power to 
make final or binding determinations, such as for monetary awards. Id. at 477-78 (citing 
Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967)). On that authority, the district 
court and Eighth Circuit in Rodgers dismissed the indictment because the defendant’s 
comments merely triggered a criminal investigation. United States v. Rodgers, 706 F.2d 
854, 855 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language “within the jurisdiction of any 
department or agency” was to be read broadly, including any matters pertaining to crimi-
nal investigations. Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 479. The defendant argued, however, that the 
more expansive construction, even if adopted, could not be applied to him retroactively 
given his reliance on the prior Eighth Circuit precedents. Id. at 484. The Supreme Court 
disagreed due to “the existence of conflicting cases from other Courts of Appeals [which] 
made review of that issue by this Court . . . reasonably foreseeable.” Id. For a discussion of 
Rodgers’ significance, see Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial 
Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 457-58 (2001). 
 162. See also Green v. Catoe, 220 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds 
by Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “if the change of law 
was reasonably foreseeable, based on indications in prior case law, then the defendant had 
sufficient notice in the due process sense”). 
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 The foreseeability inquiry, therefore, has been manipulated sub-
stantially. Courts have rationalized that litigants should have ex-
pected the new or changed judicial interpretation, even when the ju-
dicial interpretation overrules administrative or judicial precedents. 
Courts have sufficient leeway to permit retroactive application of 
new statutory interpretations in the criminal context by dint of the 
foreseeability analysis. Judicial opinions ex post can be justified on 
the basis of the general evolution of the law.163 
 Arguably, the foreseeability analysis may further rule of law val-
ues in limiting judicial power. The foreseeability inquiry may consti-
tute a sorting mechanism to separate those instances of judicial in-
terpretation that represent conventional common lawmaking or 
statutory construction from those that are fueled by animus toward 
the offender. According to traditional analysis, the Ex Post Facto 
Clause protects against arbitrary governance as well as safeguarding 
the offender’s reliance interest. Judges may interpret common law 
doctrines, statutes, or regulations in order to increase the severity of 
the punishment for one particular odious offender. Perhaps no direct 
way to police judicial bias exists, but if a construction is foreseeable, 
then it makes it less likely that animus was a determining factor. 
 On occasion, therefore, the federal courts may be convinced that 
an impermissible risk of state court bias or arbitrariness exists, as in 
Bouie itself. In Douglas v. Buder,164 the Supreme Court intervened to 
stop the apparent arbitrary determination of a Missouri state court 
judge to reincarcerate an individual who was on probation. The pro-
bationer had not immediately reported a traffic citation to his proba-
tion officer, which would be required if the citation were the equiva-
lent of an arrest.165 The Supreme Court signaled its disbelief that the 
Missouri court would ever have determined that a traffic citation 
constituted an arrest but for the court’s evident animus against the 
probationer.166 Irrespective of whether the trial court’s interpretation 
was foreseeable, Bouie allows reviewing courts to rein in lower courts 
when they appear influenced by vindictive or arbitrary aims. 
                                                                                                                    
 163. Professor Fisch’s theory of equilibrium is similar. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity 
and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997). She argues 
that most common lawmaking—as opposed to legislation—should be considered foresee-
able because the common law reflects an unstable equilibrium that can be moved with the 
slightest tug in any direction. Id. at 1108-09. Thus, litigants cannot justifiably rely on any 
particular common law position. The only exception she notes is when the Supreme Court 
overturns its own precedents. Id. at 1107-08. In that context, adjudication more closely re-
sembles legislation and may disrupt a stable equilibrium upon which litigants are entitled 
to rely. Id. at 1108. 
 164. 412 U.S. 430 (1973).  
 165. Id. at 431.  
 166. See id. at 431-32. Indeed, the probation officer and prosecutor in the case had ar-
gued that the probationer should not be reincarcerated. Id. at 431. 
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 Thus, on balance, Bouie is best understood as a means of limiting 
judicial vindictiveness rather than protecting offenders’ reliance in-
terests or ensuring repose. The foreseeability analysis acts as a crude 
filter to separate judicial reinterpretations animated by retributive 
impulses from the more familiar common law evolutionary process. 
Courts seem to determine whether barring retroactive application of 
a new interpretation is needed to restrain judicial overreaching. The 
Bouie inquiry is admittedly ad hoc, but serves as a last-line check 
against prosecutorial and judicial overreaching. 
B.   Contracts Clause 
 After Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,167 courts enforced the judicial 
impairments doctrine for the next generation. Judicial decisions that 
altered prior precedent in a way that impaired contract rights were 
suspect.168 But by the late nineteenth century, federal courts began 
retreating from the judicial impairments doctrine. For reasons of 
politics and judicial ideology, they became far more chary of pinning 
federal rights on a conclusion that state judicial opinions had 
“changed” law.169 Federal courts became increasingly loathe to sec-
ond-guess a state court’s decision as to state law matters.170 
 For instance, some federal courts strained to find no change on 
the ground that the prior state court decisions were not controlling. 
In Keokuk & W.R. Co. v. County Court,171 the question for resolution, 
although quite convoluted, concerned whether a railroad could be ex-
empt from taxation. Missouri had granted exemptions to certain rail-
roads but then forbade new exemptions several years later. At the 
time that the plaintiff railroad had formed through consolidation 
with another, a prior Missouri state court decision172 assumed that 
companies did not lose their tax exemption through merger or other 
consolidation.173 That court rejected the argument “that a change in 
the political form of civil society has the magical effect of dissolving 
                                                                                                                    
 167. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).  
 168. Federal courts principally deployed the doctrine when lower courts departed from 
prior precedent as opposed to when they merely rested a decision on an unforeseeable in-
terpretation of a statute. But see Pine Grove Township v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666, 
678 (1874) (finding an impairment of contract in absence of prior state court decision—“In 
cases properly brought before us that end can be accomplished unwarrantably no more by 
judicial decisions than by legislation”). 
 169. Thompson, supra note 75, at 1426-38. 
 170. For a time, federal courts also disregarded state courts’ older precedents if con-
vinced that they were plainly incorrect. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Coler, 113 F. 705, 708 
(4th Cir. 1902), aff’d, 190 U.S. 437 (1903); Jones v. Great S. Fireproof Hotel Co., 86 F. 370, 
372 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 177 U.S. 449 (1900). 
 171. 41 F. 305, 310 (E.D. Mo. 1890), aff’d, 152 U.S. 301 (1894). The Supreme Court af-
firmed on slightly different grounds. 
 172. See Scotland County v. Mo., Iowa & Neb. Ry. Co., 65 Mo. 123 (1877). 
 173. Id. at 134-35. 
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its moral obligations or impairing contracts previously vested”174 and 
accordingly upheld the tax exemption for the railroad. In Keokuk, the 
contract for consolidation of the two railroads included a clause that 
any immunities previously enjoyed would continue in the new com-
pany. 
 The Missouri high court later held, however, that the consolidated 
railroad was in effect a new corporation. Accordingly, the railroad 
could not rely on the prior decision. The federal courts agreed, rea-
soning that: “To say that, because a state court has once decided that 
a certain corporation is entitled to exemption from taxation, the deci-
sion must thereafter be followed, although erroneous, would involve 
consequences of such a serious [financial] nature that any court 
ought to hesitate . . . .”175 The second Missouri decision merely clari-
fied the reach of the legislative tax exemption. Accordingly, the fed-
eral court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the second state court 
decision had impaired contractual obligations (and violated a prop-
erty right). 
 Similarly, federal courts strained to distinguish the holdings in 
prior state court decisions. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sauer v. 
New York176 provides a good example. There, a homeowner chal-
lenged the city’s construction of an elevated viaduct near his home on 
several grounds. New York’s courts rejected the challenge, reasoning 
that a homeowner did not, under New York law, enjoy the right to 
unimpeded access to his home. 
 In turn, Sauer sued in federal court, arguing that the New York 
decision changed the preexisting law in New York. He cited a case 
decided four years before he acquired title to his land—Story v. Ele-
vated Railroad177—which assured landowners abutting public roads 
to easements of access, light, and air. The United States Supreme 
Court, however, was unmoved. It distinguished the prior case on the 
grounds that the city there had blocked access to benefit private cor-
porations such as railroads: “The structure in these cases were held 
to violate the land owners’ rights, not only because they were ele-
vated and thereby obstructed access, light and air, but also because 
they were designed for the exclusive and permanent use of private 
corporations.”178 Accordingly, it held that plaintiff “has not shown 
that in his case the state court has changed, to his injury, the inter-
pretation of his contract with the city . . . .”179  
                                                                                                                    
 174. Id. at 135. 
 175. Keokuk, 41 F. at 310. 
 176. 206 U.S. 536 (1907). 
 177. 90 N.Y. 122 (1882). 
 178. Sauer, 206 U.S. at 552. 
 179. Id. at 555. As Justice Holmes commented in dissent in Muhlker v. New York & 
Harlem Railroad, 197 U.S. 544 (1905), federal courts should not reverse state courts if the 
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 The Justices in dissent accused the majority of reinterpreting 
precedents to arrive at the conclusion of no changed law.180 The prior 
decision had mentioned, but not stressed, the fact that a private cor-
poration was involved. For instance, the court in Story had asked 
what “is the extent of this easement? What rights or privilege are se-
cured thereby? Generally, it may be said, it is to have the street kept 
open, so that from it access may be had to the lot and light and air 
furnished across the open way.”181 And, the court stressed that the 
“public purpose of a street requires of the soil the surface only.”182 
The dissenting judges would have held that the new judicial decision 
breached the state’s obligation to its contract.183 
 Like the Bouie doctrine today, however, the judicial impairments 
doctrine presented a flexible means for setting aside state court deci-
sions as in Gelpcke that seemed arbitrary or targeted at outsiders. 
For instance, in McCullough v. Virginia,184 bondholders challenged a 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision that bondholders could 
not require the state to accept coupons as payment of taxes because 
the 1871 bond issuance was illegal. The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed, stressing that the Virginia high court on several prior occa-
sions had upheld the bonds’ validity: 
These . . . bonds, amounting to many millions of dollars, have 
passed into the markets of the world, and have so passed accred-
ited, not merely by the action of the General Assembly of the State 
of Virginia, but by the repeated decisions of her highest court . . . 
for substantially a quarter of a century . . . .185  
Indeed, the Court stressed that in “reversing its prior rulings” the 
Virginia court “put[] at naught the repeated decisions of this court as 
well as its own.”186 As in Bouie, therefore, the judicial impairments 
doctrine served as a last-ditch means of restraining state court 
prejudice. 
 Within a generation, however, the Court stopped enforcing the ju-
dicial impairments doctrine. In part, the change stemmed from 
greater acceptance of judicial realism. As Justice Brandeis described 
                                                                                                                    
recent state courts’ efforts to distinguish prior cases were “not wanting in good sense.” Id. 
at 574-75. 
 180. Sauer, 206 U.S. at 556-60. 
 181. Story, 90 N.Y. at 146. 
 182. Id. at 161. 
 183. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to take some cases during that period 
even if some change existed on the ground that “mere reversal by a state court of its previ-
ous decision [did] not . . . violate any clause of the federal constitution.” Tidal Oil Co. v. 
Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1924); see also Brinkeroff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 
281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8 (1930). 
 184. 172 U.S. 102 (1898). 
 185. Id. at 108. 
 186. Id. at 122-23. 
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in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,187 “[t]he process of 
trial and error, of change of decision in order to conform with chang-
ing ideas and conditions,”188 was a fundamental part of all judging.189 
He continued that “[s]tate courts, like this Court, may ordinarily 
overrule their own decisions without offending constitutional guaran-
ties, even though parties may have acted to their prejudice on the 
faith of the earlier decisions.”190 With Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried191 
in 1934, the Court implicitly overruled the Gelpcke line of cases by 
holding that, in diversity cases, the Court had no choice but to accept 
state court interpretations.192 The Supreme Court has not revisited 
the Gelpcke doctrine since the beginning of the twentieth century—
judicial changes do not violate the Contracts Clause. 
 No one explanation for the decline in enforcement of the judicial 
impairments and Bouie doctrines is likely dispositive. And, the 
judges’ motivations for the decline may have changed over time. 
Nonetheless, striking similarities for the decline exist. 
 First, as a matter of federalism, it became increasingly difficult to 
justify intervention in state law matters. The Supreme Court rarely 
second-guessed state law interpretation in the hundreds of cases de-
cided each year. Although some oversight might be necessary to pro-
tect the federal constitutional rights at stake, each reversal of a state 
court decision on the ground that the court had changed state law 
appeared unseemly. 
 Moreover, over time, there may have become less reason to mis-
trust state court judges. For instance, after the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury municipal bond crisis, state courts were not as active in at-
tempting to protect local taxpayers at the expense of out-of-state in-
vestors. Similarly, after the initial years of the civil rights movement, 
state judges were not as hostile to the rights of those in the move-
ment, as they had been in Bouie itself. The United States Supreme 
Court began to trust state courts to enforce federal rights. 
 Second, distinguishing state cases that changed prior law from 
those that refined it or just applied it to a new setting became in-
creasingly problematic. As judicial realism became more accepted, 
the Court was less secure in reaching the conclusion that a state 
court decision had in fact changed state law. Given the complexities 
                                                                                                                    
 187. 281 U.S. 673 (1930). 
 188. Id. at 681 n.8; see also Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 
(1932). 
 189. The Supreme Court consistently had declined to find that judicial changes in the 
law have effected compensable takings. See Thompson, supra note 15. 
 190. Hill, 281 U.S. at 681 n.8. 
 191. 292 U.S. 487 (1934) (relying on section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
 192. Id. at 493-94. Despite Erie v. Tompkins Railroad Co., 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the 
Court still could have exercised the power to review claims directly under the Contracts 
Clause, as it had on occasion previously. See supra Part II.B. 
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of judicial decisionmaking and the difficulty of construing statutes, 
demarcating a bright line between law application and lawmaking is 
daunting. 
 Third, the Court may have believed that notice was not as impor-
tant as previously thought. Under Bouie, cases such as Mummey 
demonstrate the fictive nature of reliance. Criminal defendants do 
not scan judicial opinions prior to committing an offense. Although 
commercial entities may be more familiar with the peculiarities of 
judicial interpretations prior to entering into a deal, counsel them-
selves may well predict that certain doctrines or precedents are un-
stable. Counsel, for instance, could have predicted that the tax ex-
emption in Keokuk was not secure. In other words, judges may have 
become less committed to maintaining the status quo. 
 Fourth, and relatedly, the Court may have become more reluctant 
to privilege older as opposed to newer judicial interpretations. The 
second interpretation may be “better,” and therefore justice may be 
served by upholding the second interpretation. For instance, in 
Mummey, precluding courts from applying the new definition of 
“weapon” would have resulted in a lesser penalty for a perceived 
wrongdoer. In Metheny, retroactive application of the state court de-
cision prevented parole for a category of offenders that the legisla-
ture deemed likely to be recidivist. Similarly, in cases such as New 
Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co.,193 the judi-
cial impairment stemmed from judicial efforts to peel back legisla-
tively granted monopolies, a goal that many federal jurists likely fa-
vored.194 In Sauer, the Court may have wanted to pave the way for 
internal improvements such as the pedestrian overpass considered 
there. Preventing state courts from changing law may freeze law 
which is normatively unattractive. 
 Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court may have become more con-
cerned about the institutional impact of encouraging claims alleging 
federal constitutional violations arising from changed state law. With 
both Bouie and Contracts Clause claims, the Court perceived that the 
doctrines triggered a substantial increase in litigation. The Bouie 
doctrine presented a convenient hook upon which state defendants 
could hang their arguments, and Gelpcke threatened to convert many 
disagreements over state contract rights into a federal constitutional 
                                                                                                                    
 193. 125 U.S. 18 (1888) (upholding legislature’s decision to grant permission to refining 
company to lay water pipes despite prior legislative monopoly). 
 194. See, e.g., Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U.S. 388 (1887) (holding that legislative 
monopoly did not preclude competition from water works operated by municipality). 
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claim.195 Retrenchment may be seen as a natural response designed 
to preserve institutional resources. 
 In short, the U.S. Supreme Court has backed off from both the 
Bouie and judicial impairment doctrines for similar reasons. Con-
cerns of federalism, preserving institutional resources, the difficulty 
of determining when as a principled matter intervention is war-
ranted, and the unattractiveness of compelling state courts to adhere 
to “law” that may be “wrong” or “backward” all fueled the retreat. 
C.   Enforcement of Article II, Section 1 
 The Bouie and Contract Clause experiences shed light on the 
Rehnquist concurrence’s analysis of Florida law. No one doubts that 
Florida’s legislative scheme was open to differing interpretations. 
The only question is how far the Florida court strayed from the text. 
Few benchmarks aid that inquiry. 
 Nonetheless, courts in the Bouie and judicial impairments context 
have asked four general questions. First, courts have inquired 
whether the judicial interpretation under scrutiny reversed settled 
precedents. Indeed, that was the principal question asked in the ju-
dicial impairments context. The Court used that factor to stress that 
“new” law had been fashioned in McCullough. However, this factor 
by itself is not dispositive as suggested by the Dale and Newman 
cases. Individuals (or counsel) at times should be able to anticipate 
judicial change. In any event, the Florida court’s decision in Gore in 
no way overturned any pertinent precedent. Indeed, the 1999 revi-
sion to the election code had never been reviewed judicially prior to 
the presidential election controversy. 
 Second, to a lesser extent, federal courts have focused on whether 
state courts have overruled administrative precedents. Legislatures 
often delegate subsidiary lawmaking authority to administrative en-
tities, and courts will defer to reasonable agency interpretations of 
law that emerge from the lawmaking or enforcement context.196 
Brushing aside administrative interpretations may suggest, there-
fore, that courts are fashioning new law. The Florida court decision 
                                                                                                                    
 195. On the increased litigation in contracts cases, see CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE 
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890, at 401-05 (1939); FELIX FRANKFURTER & 
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 60-102 (1928). 
 196. Under the federal doctrine of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court has directed that courts should defer to 
reasonable constructions of statutory language by agencies. Florida courts may afford less 
deference than the U.S. Supreme Court to agency construction of statutory language, but it 
defers nonetheless. See Donato v. AT&T, 767 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2000); Tampa Elec. Co. v. 
Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2000); Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 
2d 840, 844 (Fla. 1993); cf. James Rossi, HAMSTRINGING STATE AGENCY AUTHORITY TO 
PROMULGATE RULES: A QUESTIONABLE WAY TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 29 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10735 (Dec. 1, 1999). 
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set aside the Florida Secretary of State’s opinion on defining “lawful” 
votes,197 and the legislature had delegated the Secretary authority to 
oversee elections.198 
 That clash, however, does not significantly support the Rehnquist 
concurrence’s determination. As an initial matter, the Secretary of 
State issued the opinion in the midst of the election crisis, not before. 
The administrative precedent, therefore was in no way settled. In 
addition, courts retain the right to reject any administrative con-
struction of the law that is deemed unreasonable. As the Metheny ex-
ample illustrates, courts have not hesitated to find that judicial re-
versals of administrative precedent are foreseeable. Even if the court 
erred in overturning the precedent, that error is not by itself tanta-
mount to a conclusion that the court changed the manner that the 
legislature provided for selecting presidential electors. Courts may 
pay insufficient heed to administrative rulings without changing the 
law. 
 Third, courts have investigated whether developments in other ju-
risdictions made the state court decision under scrutiny foreseeable. 
Although an interpretation by another state’s highest court obviously 
is not controlling, reviewing courts have relied on such developments 
to suggest that the state court decision under consideration is not 
unexpected. Indeed, as in Rogers and Mummey, one might defend the 
Florida court’s analysis as to what constitutes a lawful vote by refer-
ence to the position adopted by other states.199 State courts had held 
that the intent of the voter standard governs. From the perspective of 
the developing law in other jurisdictions, therefore, the Florida Su-
preme Court decision seems foreseeable.200 
 Fourth, the question of whether the Florida court’s interpretation 
derived from the legislature’s text is more open-ended. Judgments 
can differ. Certainly, the concurrence’s sally that the Florida court 
rid the certification of independent meaning finds its mark. On the 
other hand, no specific language in the statute mandates deference. 
Moreover, the statute is not clear as to whether the intent of the 
voter standard was to govern. Overall, as compared to cases such as 
Mummey and Lanier, the Florida court’s interpretation rests more 
                                                                                                                    
 197. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1282-83 (Fla. 
2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 198. See FLA. STAT. § 97.012(1) (2000) (designating Secretary of State as “chief election 
officer“ with the responsibility to “[o]btain and maintain uniformity in the application, 
operation, and interpretation of election laws”). 
 199. See the discussion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 150-54 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing); see also Brief for Respondents at 36, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949). 
 200. Professor Pildes argues that, in the election context, federal courts should stay 
their hands unless plaintiffs can show, in addition, detrimental reliance. Pildes, supra note 
13, at 722-23.  
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comfortably on the legislative language.201 Using the benchmarks set 
out in the Bouie and Contracts Clause context highlights the weak-
ness of the concurrence’s analysis. 
 In retrospect, the concurrence’s chief error may have stemmed 
from its assumption that the Article II, Section 1 directive demands 
stringent enforcement. The question should not be whether the Flor-
ida court “distorted the [statutory language] beyond what a fair read-
ing required.” Because the “beyond . . . a fair reading” standard is so 
open-ended, it invites second-guessing by reviewing courts. The 
standard converges with one of clear legal error. The Supreme 
Court’s own interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, in many 
minds, might be characterized as distorting the Equal Protection 
Clause “beyond what a fair reading required.” The Court never ap-
plied Bouie or the judicial impairments doctrine to state court deci-
sions that were merely wrong, or even clearly wrong. Rather, inter-
vention should be reserved only for the most adventurous or unan-
ticipated judicial changes in the law.202  
 Full enforcement of the Article II, Section 1 provision should be 
rejected. Despite the importance of federal oversight, the concerns 
prompting a more hands-off stance in the Bouie and Contracts 
Clause contexts fully apply. Indeed, the reasons against federal judi-
cial second-guessing were even stronger in Bush v. Gore than in the 
contexts described above. 
 As an initial matter, the institutional arguments are quite power-
ful. The Rehnquist concurrence would open federal courthouse doors 
to any claim that state jurists have changed the manner in which 
electors can be chosen. Any judicial interpretation of appropriate dis-
tricts set out by the legislature, of appropriate voting methodology, of 
tabulation procedures, or of a state’s contest process could form the 
basis of a federal challenge. Particularly when a presidential election 
may hang in the balance, inviting such challenges risks embroiling 
the Court in political disputes. Over time, courts will likely become 
more reticent about inviting challenges to judicial interpretations of 
selection decisions given the high stakes. Although the Court—and 
particularly the concurring Justices—seemed eager to take on the 
challenge of determining whether the Florida Justices changed law 
in Bush v. Gore, it is doubtful whether subsequent courts will be so 
willing. 
                                                                                                                    
 201. See also Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional 
History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001) (lambasting concurrence’s analysis of Florida law). 
 202. Even under the concurrence’s standard of “beyond what a fair reading required,” 
the dissenting Justices were on firm terrain in finding that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretations were grounded in the statutory language. 
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 Aside from the institutional concerns, the inquiry of whether a ju-
dicial construction of a state’s legislative scheme for selecting electors 
changed the law is insufficiently bounded. On the one hand, almost 
every judicial decision of interest either elaborates on a previously 
uncertain point or clarifies a prior conflict. The common law method 
presupposes at least interstitial change. Evolution may at times ap-
pear more dramatic than at others. In a sense, therefore, many judi-
cial decisions “change” the law, whether through interpretation of 
statutes or modifications of prior judicial doctrines. 
 On the other hand, judges can always rationalize various opinions 
as foreseeable. Some decisions are, of course, more anticipated than 
others, but the decisions following Bouie are ample testament to the 
elasticity of the inquiry. In Bush v. Gore, for instance, the fact that 
four of the seven Justices on the Florida Supreme Court agreed on a 
set of key interpretations of the legislative landscape, and that their 
view was defended as plausible by four U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 
demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing interpretation from 
lawmaking. Reasonable minds may disagree as to what is a reason-
able interpretation. There are few objective benchmarks available to 
determine which decisions “change” the law as opposed to adapting 
law to respond to new social, economic, or technological realities, or 
even an unforeseen set of facts. The general foreseeability inquiry in 
the Bouie and judicial impairments contexts—based on consistency 
with judicial precedent, administrative precedent, precedent from 
other jurisdictions, and the statutory text—does not add sufficient 
concreteness or predictability. 
 In addition, the concurrence’s approach undermines the respect 
due state judiciaries. Although this Supreme Court has championed 
federalism by limiting the powers of Congress,203 the concurrence’s 
position all but heaps scorn on state jurists. Second-guessing state 
court decisions to determine whether they go beyond “interpreting” 
law undermines the respect due to the highest court of the states. 
The decline in enforcement of the Bouie and judicial impairment doc-
trines in no small measure arose because of increased confidence and 
respect in state judges.  
 Indeed, review of state court decisionmaking under Article II—
from a federalism perspective—is far more jolting than under Bouie 
                                                                                                                    
 203. For a sampling of recent decisions, see Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 
(2000) (holding that Congress could not subject states to suit in federal court for violations 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(limiting Congress’s power under Commerce Clause); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000) (limiting Congress’s power to impose suit against states under the Eleventh 
Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (deriving principle that prevents 
congressional commandeering of state officials under the Tenth Amendment); see also City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting Congress’s power to fashion appropriate 
legislation to enforce equal protection requirements in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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or the Contracts Clause. The consequence of a successful challenge in 
the latter two contexts is that the interpretation cannot be applied 
retroactively. The state courts, however, remain free to apply inter-
pretations such as the trespassing rule in Bouie or the authority to 
issue bonds in Gelpcke prospectively. Retroactive invalidation does 
not tie the state courts’ hands in future cases, once notice has been 
assured. 
 The Rehnquist concurrence, however, would have precluded appli-
cation of the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of election law 
in all future cases. Even if the Florida court afforded notice, the con-
currence still would have invalidated the state court holding for 
abridging the legislature’s authority under Article II to select the 
manner in which electors are chosen. Viewed in that light, review 
under Article II is not concerned so much with retroactivity but with 
the allocation of power between state legislature and judiciary. Re-
view by federal courts, therefore, compromises state judicial author-
ity to a greater degree than in the retroactivity cases.204 
 The threat to federalism accordingly is more acute in the Article II 
setting than in other contexts. As an analogy, consider the independ-
ent and adequate state grounds doctrine. Under Michigan v. Long,205 
the Court will not review a state court decision if an independent 
state ground exists, even if the decision includes an analysis of a fed-
eral constitutional guarantee. The state ground may have been 
crafted in order to insulate the state court decision on federal law 
from Supreme Court review. Regardless, the U.S. Court will not in-
tervene. 
 Prior to Michigan v. Long, however, the Court scrutinized the 
state law ground to determine whether it was “adequate” enough to 
immunize the decision from federal court review.206 Justifications 
deemed too makeweight or too ill thought-out were not sufficient to 
insulate the state courts from federal review. The Court rejected that 
tradition in Michigan v. Long in part because “[t]he process of exam-
ining state law is unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret 
state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar.”207 In addition, 
the Court justified its refusal to second-guess state law grounds on 
“[r]espect for state courts.”208 Under Michigan v. Long, therefore, the 
Court will permit state court interpretations of state law with which 
it would be unlikely to concur. For instance, the Florida Supreme 
                                                                                                                    
 204. I am indebted to Trevor Morrison on this point. 
 205. 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-41 (1983). 
 206. See, e.g., Texas v. Grown, 460 U.S. 730, 732 n.1 (1983); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 
282 U.S. 765 (1931). 
 207. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039. 
 208. Id. at 1040. 
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Court in State v. Lavazzoli209 disagreed with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s view of search and seizure doctrine but pegged its decision on 
a novel interpretation of Florida’s constitutional requirements.210 
Under the independent and adequate grounds doctrine, no federal 
review could follow. 
 The Rehnquist concurrence does not manifest the same measure 
of respect for state court interpretation of state law. The concurrence 
dismissed difficult questions of state law with the back of its hand. 
On questions of the U.S. Supreme Court’s own power, the Rehnquist 
Court ironically has become nationalistic.211 
 Finally, the radical “realism” of the Rehnquist concurrence—
equating judicial interpretation with lawmaking—if followed, might 
well have a destabilizing effect on other areas of the law. Viewing ju-
dicial interpretation as changed law can open a wide array of consti-
tutional challenges to judicial decisionmaking. For instance, courts 
might heed the analysis in the concurrence to permit far more Bouie 
challenges despite Rogers. As a result, the burden of convicting and 
sentencing clearly guilty offenders would increase. Similarly, pres-
sure would increase to recognize takings challenges to judicial deci-
sions, an area in which courts have so far steered clear.212 
 Curiously, Justice Scalia, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Georgia,213 recognized the difficulty of characterizing judicial law-
making as legislation. There, the Court considered whether to apply 
new constitutional rules retroactively. Concurring in the judgment, 
Justice Scalia explained why he believed that courts could not, like 
legislatures, apply new rules prospectively only: the Article III judi-
cial power “must be deemed to be the judicial power as understood by 
our common-law tradition. That is the power  ‘to say what the law is,’ 
not the power to change it.”214 Justice Scalia immediately continued, 
however, that “I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) 
as to be unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”215 But, they 
make law “as judges make it, which is to say as though they were 
‘finding’ it—discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it 
                                                                                                                    
 209. 434 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1983). 
 210. Id. at 323-24. 
 211. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 426 (2000) (holding that state (and lower 
federal) courts must abide by Supreme Court’s constitutional common lawmaking in the 
Miranda decision); Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582 
(1995) (depriving state courts of power to enjoin state taxing authority sued under federal 
law).  
 212. See Thompson, supra note 15, at 1498-1502 (addressing institutional factors that 
have led some to caution against recognizing judicial takings). 
 213. 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
 214. Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803)). 
 215. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”216 Maintaining the 
fiction that judges do not make law may be important to the judicial 
system as we know it. 
 To the extent that judges are considered lawmakers, pressure 
builds to impose the same constraints on judges that currently cir-
cumscribe legislative authority. In particular, the limits on retroac-
tive decisionmaking embodied in the Ex Post Facto Clause, Bill of At-
tainder, and Takings Clauses might apply. Such constraints would, 
for better or worse, straightjacket judicial decisions considerably. At 
least in contexts such as criminal law and property rights, in which 
retroactivity is disfavored, much judicial decisionmaking would be 
suspect. 
 In short, the concurrence plausibly concluded that judges can re-
view claims alleging that state legislatures have been deprived of 
their constitutional power to determine the manner in which presi-
dential electors are selected. Nonetheless, concerns for preserving in-
stitutional capital, avoiding administrative line-drawing difficulties, 
maintaining tenets of federalism, and fostering stability in other doc-
trinal areas all suggest that the constitutional provision should not 
be aggressively enforced. 
 Underenforcing the Article II, Section 1 directive would not be 
novel. One relatively familiar example may prove helpful. In Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,217 the Court declined 
to enforce the Tenth Amendment principally for institutional rea-
sons. In rejecting a challenge to application of the Federal Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) to a municipal body, the Court reasoned that a 
judicially crafted test to distinguish traditional from other state func-
tions was “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.”218 The 
Court had previously struggled in fashioning a test to determine 
which state functions to preserve from federal interference. Despite 
the Court’s decision not to enforce the Tenth Amendment directly, it 
signaled that the Tenth Amendment norm continued to merit defer-
ence. 
 In legislating, Congress still presumably considered the Tenth 
Amendment norm to the extent that it considers any constitutional 
                                                                                                                    
 216. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 217. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 218. Id. at 546. The Court justified its refusal to enforce the Amendment on the ground 
that political process checks existed to check Congress’s regulation of state and local gov-
ernmental authorities, namely that state and local governments enjoyed ample voice in 
Congress’s affairs. See Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Comment: 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
153, 173 (1997) (arguing that the court should defer to congressional interpretation of con-
stitutional text when judicially appropriate standards are wanting). 
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question.219 Indeed, Congress amended the FLSA after Garcia to pro-
tect local governments from some of the Act’s provisions.220 A consti-
tutional provision can retain vitality even when not actively enforced 
by the judiciary.221 In a system marked by separated powers and fed-
eralism, the Court logically may allow institutional factors to shape 
constitutional rights.222 Just as in Garcia, an underenforcement tack 
in reviewing claims under Article II, Section 1 would reflect a strat-
egy of enforcing constitutional rights indirectly to avoid the political 
or institutional pitfalls of more direct enforcement. 
 The Supreme Court should only conclude that state courts have 
changed the manner in which electors are selected in the rare case. 
The U.S. Court should not intervene unless the state court’s con-
struction is both unsupportable by reference to conventional textual 
analysis and relevant precedents and, in addition, threatens to gut 
the legislature’s control of the process to select presidential electors. 
CONCLUSION 
 The concurrence’s opinion in Bush v. Gore is as startling as it is 
misconceived. The opinion oozes disrespect for the Justices on the 
Florida Supreme Court and flies in the face of the Court’s frequent 
paeans to the fundamental role of federalism in our system. Federal-
ism is something evidently that Congress, not the Court, must live 
with. 
 To be sure, the concurrence was on firm ground in asserting the 
power to review the Florida Supreme Court’s construction of state 
                                                                                                                    
 219. Obviously, members of Congress do not usually pore over constitutional law tomes 
prior to voting on proposals. Most members are probably inclined to allow the judiciary to 
resolve any disputed issue. But members of Congress formally have the obligation to up-
hold the Constitution. Some may solicit the views of others as to the constitutionality of 
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 220. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 
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narrowly in light of Tenth Amendment concerns to preserve state sovereignty. In Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the Court determined that Congress had not evinced a 
clear enough intent to subject state judges to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 
The Court explained that its clear statement approach ensures “that the legislature has in 
fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial de-
cision.” Id. at 461 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). 
 221. The Court has recently enforced the Tenth Amendment more actively. See Printz 
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (limiting scope of Brady Handgun Violence Preven-
tion Act); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (stating that Congress cannot 
compel states to enforce federal regulatory programs). 
 222. The Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), can be 
viewed from a similar perspective. The Court may have upheld the $1,000 contribution 
limitation on the ground that, despite the First Amendment interests at stake, Congress 
was institutionally better able to set an appropriate limit. Id. at 24-30. The nondelegation 
doctrine can be viewed in similar light. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 
(2001). 
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law. Otherwise, the Article II, Section 1 directive that state legisla-
tures must select the manner in which presidential electors are cho-
sen might become a dead letter. State judges through their interpre-
tations might change the way that electors are selected and thereby 
rob the legislature of its constitutionally assigned function. 
 But judicial interpretations should only rarely be considered tan-
tamount to lawmaking. The Bouie line of cases and judicial impair-
ments precedents manifest skepticism about the wisdom of second-
guessing state court interpretations of state law—the concurrence 
simply ignored the doctrinal history. Courts backed off from full en-
forcement for a number of reasons. Drawing a line between interpret-
ing and making law is notoriously slippery. Few benchmarks exist to 
determine when interpretation stops and lawmaking starts. More-
over, equating judicial interpretation with lawmaking provides in-
centive for disappointed litigants to seek redress in federal court for 
their disagreement with the state court interpretation of state law. 
And, the more we equate judicial interpretation with lawmaking, the 
more society may be willing to restrain judges. The lessons of history 
should have alerted the concurrence to the quagmire of robust en-
forcement of the Article II, Section 1 directive—some constitutional 
rights are better left underenforced. 
